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Individuals in a social dilemma may experience a self-control conflict between urges to act 
selfishly and better judgment to cooperate. Pairing a public goods game with a subtle framing 
technique, we test whether perception of self-control conflict strengthens the association 
between self-control and cooperation. Consistent with our hypothesis, cooperative behavior is 
positively associated with self-control in the treatment that raised the relative likelihood of 
perceiving conflict, but not associated with self-control in the treatment that lowered the 
likelihood. Our results indicate that self-control benefits cooperation.  
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1. Introduction   
The social dilemma involves a tension between the individual rationality of self-interest 
and the collective well-being. However, it might also represent an internal tension, a conflict 
of preferences within the individual. We explore the social dilemma by conceptualizing the 
decision to cooperate as a conflict of preferences—between the impulse of greed and the 
better judgment to act pro-socially. As such, the question of acting selfishly or cooperatively 
becomes one of self-control, and the ‘stronger’ the individual, the more cooperation we would 
expect to observe. However, self-control matters only to the extent that the individual 
recognizes the decision at hand as a self-control conflict (Myrseth & Fishbach, 2009). 
Following these ideas, Kocher et al. (2012) theorized about, and found evidence of, a positive 
correlation between the capacity for self-control and cooperation among participants who 
reported feeling conflicted during the contribution decision—but not among participants who 
reported no conflict. In this paper, we directly test the causality of conflict identification in the 
public good game.  
We present a simple model of rational self-control in the public good game (for surveys 
on public goods experiments, see, e.g., Ledyard, 1995; Zelmer, 2003; Gächter, 2007; 
Chaudhuri, 2011). This model captures the conflict between cooperative (pro-social) and 
selfish behavior. Specifically, we model the internal conflict between free-riding and 
contribution to the public good as a two-stage decision problem; first, there is an 
identification stage and, second, a contribution stage; self-control1 determines the cost of 
cooperative behavior. Our framework for understanding cooperation is complementary to a 
range of other interpretations and findings. These include altruism, warm-glow, inequity 
aversion, efficiency preferences, reciprocity, logic of appropriateness, and the sheer confusion 
of individuals (see, for instance, Andreoni, 1990; 1995; Palfrey & Prisbrey, 1997; Anderson 
et al., 1998; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Houser & Kurzban, 2002; Weber et al., 2004).  
We test our model in a public good game, with experimental treatments to influence the 
identification stage in the self-control model; we do so by adopting the framing technique 
used by Martinsson et al. (2012) to influence perceived conflict in the dictator game (see also 
Myrseth & Fishbach, 2010). Participants played a one-shot linear public goods game, of the 
Fischbacher et al. (2001) design, which elicits conditional contribution schedules through a 
variant of the strategy vector method (Selten, 1967), together with an unconditional 
contribution and an expectation of others’ unconditional contributions. At the very end, 
                                                
1 We use the terms “willpower” and “self-control (effort)” synonymously. 
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participants completed a measure of trait self-control (Rosenbaum, 1980a), and they also 
reported how conflicted they felt during the cooperation decision. 
We find support for our main predictions. Identification of self-control conflict induced 
a stronger positive association between trait self-control and cooperation, as measured by 
unconditional and conditional contributions; participants in the framing treatment that 
prompted relatively higher likelihood of conflict identification exhibited a positive association 
between trait self-control and cooperation, but the participants in the treatment that prompted 
a lower likelihood of identification exhibited no correlation. Furthermore, an auxiliary test 
verifies that our treatments influenced perceived conflict as intended; participants in the 
treatment intended to raise the relative likelihood of conflict identification reported that they 
felt more conflicted during the decision to cooperate than did participants in the treatment 
intended to reduce the likelihood. 
We organize the remainder of the paper as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on 
the relation between pro-social behavior and self-control. Section 3 derives our predictions, 
and Section 4 explains our experimental design. We present in Section 5 the experimental 
results. Section 6 discusses our findings and concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Self-control and pro-social behavior 
 
2.1 Self-control and social dilemmas 
Long essential to psychologists’ understanding of cognition, dual process theories are 
gaining ground in the study of economic behavior (Alós-Ferrer & Strack, 2014). We adopt the 
dual process perspective and conceptualize self-control as a “cold” executive function that 
guides behavior in the face of “hot” impulses to act against better judgment (see e.g., 
Loewenstein, 1996; 2000; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; O’Donoghue & Loewenstein, 2007; 
Hofmann et al., 2009). As such, willpower represents the resources that the executive 
function wields in a struggle against temptation (see e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998). The 
resources may include cognitive strategies to divert attention away from temptation (Mischel, 
et al., 1989), strategies of pre-commitment (Thaler & Shefrin, 1981; Schelling, 1984), or 




The question of how pro-social versus selfish behavior relates to self-control was 
broached by Loewenstein (1996; 2000), who suggests that selfish behavior may be motivated 
by visceral urges or drive-states, resembling cravings for relief from hunger, pain, and sexual 
deprivation. O’Donoghue and Loewenstein (2007) offer a conceptual framework for 
understanding how selfish urges may conflict with the “colder,” more abstract preferences for 
altruism.2 Overall, recent empirical work is mixed, depending on experimental paradigms. 
Most pertinent to our paper are studies on various forms of social dilemmas. Among 
these, fairly consistent evidence is reported from studies on time preferences. Curry et al. 
(2008) find in a standard public goods game that individuals’ discount rates are negatively 
associated with their contributions to the public good. In other words, more “impatient” 
individuals contributed less to the public good than did “patient” ones. Fehr and Leibbrandt 
(2011) arrive at a similar pattern; they report that patient (vs. impatient) fishermen—
according to time preferences elicited in the lab—were in the field less likely to over-exploit 
the common pool resource. Moreover, Burks et al. (2009) report that “short-term” patience—
the β in the β-δ model—is positively associated with cooperative behavior in a sequential 
prisoner’s dilemma.3  
Rand et al. (2012) and Rand et al. (2014), however, sound a contradictory message. 
Across a series of public good games, most administered online, they find that lower decision 
times are associated with more cooperative behavior and that time-pressure increases 
cooperation. They interpret this as evidence that giving is ‘spontaneous’ and greed 
‘calculated’. Similarly, Lotito et al. (2013) report that lower decision times are associated 
with more cooperation in a public good game, and Nielsen et al. (2013) find that free-riders, 
classified according to the Fischbacher et al. (2001) taxonomy of contributor types, exhibit 
longer decision times than do conditional cooperators. Tinghög et al. (2013), however, find 
no statistically significant effect of time-pressure in public good games, whereas Lohse et al. 
(2014) report the opposite pattern—that decision times are positively correlated with 
contributions. Because one could interpret the time-pressure treatment as a manipulation of 
cognitive resources, it is relevant to consider cognitive load treatments, which impair 
executive function by depleting cognitive resources; Duffy and Smith (2012) report no effect 
                                                
2 For an alternative conceptualization of the relationship between self-control and cooperation, see for example 
Rachlin (2004). 
3 For work in economics on self-control and time inconsistency, see e.g. hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting models by Strotz (1955) and Laibson (1997), the “planner-doer” model by Thaler and Shefrin 
(1981), and the dual-self model by Fudenberg and Levine (2006) or the simplified version in Fudenberg et al. 
(2014). For work on procrastination, see e.g. O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) and Burger et al. (2011). 
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of cognitive load on outcomes across treatments in a repeated multi-player prisoner’s 
dilemma. We conclude, therefore, that the state of empirical evidence on the relationship 
between cooperation and cognitive resources, also when conceptualized as decision times, is 
unclear.  
Another recent empirical paradigm, which relies on a psychometric measure of trait 
self-control, shows that self-control and cooperation are positively correlated. In a one-shot, 
linear public good game, Kocher et al. (2012) tested a model of the relation between 
cooperation, self-control, risk-preferences, and the contributions of other players. Consistent 
with predictions from their model, cooperation are positively associated with the Rosenbaum 
(1980a) measure of trait self-control, and this association is moderated by risk-preferences—
higher risk aversion implies a weaker association. Moreover, using the conditional 
cooperation schedule elicited through the strategy method, they find that the level of 
cooperation by other players moderates this interaction. Also consistent with their model, the 
aforementioned patterns are obtained for individuals who reported feeling conflicted during 
the decision to cooperate—not for those who reported no conflict whatsoever. Notably, their 
study does not feature any experimental treatments—it is purely correlational. Our present 
paper, in contrast, tests the causality of conflict identification in a public good game, by 
manipulating experienced conflict during the decision to cooperate.  
Finally, Myrseth et al. (2013) vary in the public good game the degree to which cash is 
tangible—and therefore more viscerally tempting—by representing cash either in physical 
form or solely on the computer screen. The authors find that the positive association between 
cooperation and Rosenbaum (1980a) trait self-control is stronger when cash is represented in 
physical form than when it is presented more abstractly, on the computer screen.  
 
2.2 Self-control and dictator games 
The pattern emerging from games that explore pure altruism is relatively similar to that 
from social dilemmas. Piovesan and Wengstrӧm (2009) measure decision times of 
participants in a repeated dictator game, lasting 24 periods.4 They find both across and within 
participants that shorter decision times are associated with more selfish choices. One 
interpretation of their results is that the default behavior is to act selfishly and that pro-social 
behavior requires the successful resolution of a self-control conflict. Such successful 
resolution of conflict would require cognitive resources, thereby raising response time. 
                                                
4 For a general discussion of the utility and merit of decision times in economics, see Rubinstein (2007). 
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Accordingly, Achtziger et al. (2014a) manipulated cognitive resources in a 12-period dictator 
game. They find that depleting cognitive resources before the game reduced giving already in 
the first period. Moreover, giving in the ‘low-depletion’ treatment dropped as the rounds went 
on, converging in the final round on the amount given by players in the ‘high-depletion’ 
treatment. Similarly, Halali et al. (2013) report that cognitively depleted players in a four-
period dictator game were less likely to give away half of their endowment.5 Hauge et al. 
(2009), however, report no effect of cognitive load on players in one-shot dictator games, 
consistent with Cornellisen et al. (2011), who report no main effect of cognitive load across 
three low-stake dictator games.6 Using a somewhat different experimental procedure—a 
repeated ‘mini-dictator game’, where participants face dichotomous choices between “fair” 
and “unfair” allocations—Schulz et al. (2014) point in a different direction: cognitive load 
raised the proportion of altruistic choices.  
Martinsson et al. (2012) show that donations to the Red Cross in a one-shot dictator 
game are positively correlated with participants’ scores on the Rosenbaum (1980a) measure 
of trait self-control. Moreover, the correlation was found in the framing treatment that was 
expected to raise the relative likelihood of identification of self-control conflict—not in the 
framing treatment that was expected to reduce the likelihood. Finally, Aguilar-Pardo et al. 
(2013) also report evidence of a positive relationship between self-control and altruistic 
behavior. In a dictator game featuring 4- to 6-year-old children, they find that children who 
donated candies in the dictator game also performed better on tasks of inhibitory control.  
 
2.3 Other evidence  
A growing literature on the “default” response in games of trust and reciprocity offers 
conflicting evidence. Achtziger et al. (2014b) subjected German players in an ultimatum 
game to cognitive resource depletion, and show that depleted proposers made lower offers—
they became less altruistic. Moreover, depleted responders were more likely to reject offers 
that were unfair to themselves—they exhibited “altruistic punishment.” The full pattern, 
however, reversed for Spanish participants, and, similarly, Halali et al. (2014) report that 
Israeli proposers made higher offers under cognitive depletion. Moving to neuroscience, 
Crockett et al. (2008) subjected responders to acute tryptophan depletion—a procedure that 
                                                
5 Players only had the option to give between 0 and 50% of their endowment. 
6 Cornellisen et al. (2011) break down the data according to Liebrand’s (1984) measure of social value 
orientation (social preferences); cognitive load increased giving among individuals classified as “pro-socials”, 
but that there was no effect among the majority of participants, classified as “pro-selves.” 
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temporarily reduces serotonin levels in the brain and thereby impairs self-control 
(Schweighofer et al., 2008); reduced serotonin levels raised rejection rates, and this reduction 
is positively correlated with impulsive choice in a delay-discounting task (Crockett et al., 
2010). However, Knoch et al. (2006) report conflicting results. They subjected participants’ 
right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex—thought to be responsible for executive functioning 
(Miller & Cohen, 2001)—to low-frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation, in 
order to impair functioning in the targeted region. The authors find that responders under 
diminished executive functioning exhibited substantially lower rejection rates—less altruistic 
punishment.  
In a trust game, Knoch et al. (2009) subjected receivers’ right lateral prefrontal cortex to 
transcranial magnetic stimulation. The authors show that receivers, though aware that 
returning a share of the amount received was both strategic and norm-compliant, were unable 
to do so under impaired executive functioning; self-control seemed necessary to resist the 
temptation to keep the amount received entirely for oneself. 
Finally, in a delay of gratification paradigm, Albrecht et al. (2011) show that individuals 
who chose for themselves between immediate and delayed rewards exhibited less patience 
and more affective involvement (activation in the dopaminergic reward system) than did 
individuals who made such choices for others—or for themselves in the future (for consistent 
results, see Pronin et al., 2008). 
 
 
3. Behavioral predictions 
 
3.1 Utility 
Our empirical setting is a one-shot linear public goods game, where πi is the payoff, ei 
the endowment, ci the contribution level, and α the marginal return from the public good: 
 
 𝜋! = 𝑒! − 𝑐! + 𝛼 𝑐!!!!! .  (1) 
 
Assuming 0 < α< 1 and α·n > 1, this payoff function satisfies the requirements of a public 
good.  
To derive our predictions, we analyze individually optimal behavior, treating the 
average contribution of other players in the public goods game as exogenously given. The 
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average contribution by others is defined as 𝑐 = !!!! 𝑐!!!!!!! . Because 𝑐! = 𝑐 + 𝑐!!!!! , we 
can write 𝜋! 𝑐! , 𝑐 = 𝑒! − 1− 𝛼 𝑐! + 𝛼 𝑛 − 1 𝑐. 
We assume an agent whose preferences are described by the utility function 𝑈!(𝑐! , 𝑐): 
 
 𝑈!(𝑐! , 𝑐) = 𝜋! 𝑐! , 𝑐 − 𝑠! 𝑐! − 𝑓!(𝑐 − 𝑐!)   (2)  
 
The second component, si(ci), specifies the cost of exercising self-control. This cost is 
‘opportunity-based’, as in Fudenberg and Levine (2006). The underlying idea is that 
temptation strength is proportional to the appeal of available alternatives. In this case, greed 
grows stronger when the difference between the highest available monetary payoff and the 
expected monetary payoff increases. Given 𝑐, the difference between the highest conceivable 
monetary payoff (obtained by contributing zero) and the expected monetary payoff when 
contributing 𝑐! is 𝜋! 0, 𝑐 − 𝜋! 𝑐! , 𝑐 = 1− 𝛼 𝑐! .  Assuming a linear functional form as in 
Fudenberg and Levine (2006), we write the cost of self-control as 
 𝑠! 𝑐! = !!! !!!! ,        (3) 
 
where the self-control cost is moderated by a willpower parameter ωi > 0.7 
The third and final component, fi(c̄ - ci), specifies a cost of deviating from the average 
contribution of others. We assume a standard quadratic cost function as in (4) 
 
 ( ) ( )2
2
i
i i if c c c c
β
− = − , (4) 
 
where βi > 0 is a parameter that measures sensitivity to deviations from mean contributions.  
The motivation behind our approach is to describe an agent with altruistic motivations, 
but who nevertheless feels tempted to be selfish. That is, the agent experiences a self-control 
conflict between her better judgment to act pro-socially and the temptation to act selfishly. 
Moreover, to represent observed patterns of conditional cooperation (see, e.g. Fischbacher et 
al., 2001; Fischbacher & Gächter, 2010), the agent experiences a cost from deviating from the 
                                                
7 Note that the self-control cost can be specified for any “cooperation default.” We adopt for simplicity this 
assumption about behavior in the case of no identification. In the case of no identification, it does not matter 
qualitatively whether the agent is slightly altruistic, for example, due to decision heuristics. What is important, 
however, is that the agent will wish to be more cooperative in the case of identification. 
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average contribution of others—the greater the deviation, the larger the cost experienced by 
the agent. Finally, to resolve this self-control conflict, the agent must expend costly effort. 
This effort is modeled with the approach by Fudenberg and Levine (2006), and implemented 
into the utility function accordingly.8  
We can now state the utility function in full as  
 𝑈!(𝑐! , 𝑐) = 𝑒! − 1− 𝛼 𝑐! + 𝛼 𝑛 − 1 𝑐 − !!! !!!! − !!! 𝑐 − 𝑐! !.  (5) 
 
3.2 The decision problem 
The agent’s decision problem consists of two stages. At the identification stage, agent 
either identifies conflict with probability pi or does not identify conflict with probability 1 – 
pi. We denote conflict identification by 𝐶 ∈ 0,1 , where C = 1 indicates that the agent has 
identified conflict, and C = 0 that the agent has not. If the agent identifies self-control conflict, 
she perceives the full utility function, while if she does not, she perceives only the utility from 
monetary payoffs, as in (6) 
 
 𝑈! = 𝑒! − 1− 𝛼 𝑐! + 𝛼 𝑛 − 1 𝑐 − !!! !!!! − !!! 𝑐 − 𝑐! ! 𝑖𝑓  𝐶 = 1𝑒! − 1− 𝛼 𝑐! + 𝛼 𝑛 − 1 𝑐 𝑖𝑓  𝐶 = 0    (6) 
 
Hence, if the agent does not identify self-control conflict, she is presumed entirely selfish, 
with a utility function that prescribes only profit maximization in the public goods game.9  
If the agent does not identify conflict (C = 0), the optimal contribution is zero, 𝑐!∗ 0 = 0. If the agent does identify conflict (C = 1), optimal contribution is given by 𝑐!∗ 1 = max(𝑐 − 𝑘! 𝛼 , 0), where 𝑘! 𝛼 = (!!!)! 1+ !!! . Hence, if average contributions of 
others are sufficiently large 𝑐 ≥ 𝑘! 𝛼 , the expected cooperation is given by  
 
                                                
8 Kocher et al. (2012) present a more generalized version of this model that incorporates risk preferences 
specified over monetary payoffs. Hauge (2010) employs a similar approach for the dictator game. 
9 This assumption is adopted for modeling convenience, but can of course be relaxed by including minor 
altruistic components of the utility function to allow for any “cooperation default,” as long as the full utility 
function prescribes more cooperation than does the “selfish component.” This assumption can thus be viewed as 
a simplifying normalization.  
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  𝑐! = 𝑝! 𝑐 − 𝑘! 𝛼 . (7) 
 
Consequently, as long as 𝑐 > 𝑘! 𝛼  holds, we predict the following: 
  
PREDICTION 1:  Given 𝑐 > 𝑘! 𝛼 , 0iβ > , and 0ip > , higher levels of willpower iω  are 
associated with higher levels of observed cooperation, and this association increases in the 
probability of identifying conflict pi. 
 
If the agent does not identify conflict, willpower is unrelated to cooperation, as the agent will 
only seek to maximize profit. However, if the agent has identified conflict, she holds pro-
social motivations, and would prefer to cooperate when she knows that other group members, 
on average, cooperate. Because cooperation is costly also in terms of self-control, a higher 
level of willpower will allow the agent to cooperate more. Hence, we predict higher levels of 
cooperation iˆc  in the public goods game for higher levels of self-control. Furthermore, 
raising the likelihood of conflict identification pi leads more agents to identify conflict, and 
for these individuals self-control will be positively associated with cooperation. On the group 
level, therefore, we expect to observe that cooperation weakly increases in likelihood of 
conflict identification pi. 
 
PREDICTION 2: An increase in the average cooperation by other group members c , raises 
iˆc if 0iβ >  and 0ip >  and leads to a strict increase only if 𝑐 > 𝑘! 𝛼  
 
Because deviating from the average cooperation of others is costly to an agent with 
0iβ >  who has identified the self-control conflict, raising c will lead to weakly higher levels 
of cooperation iˆc , with a strict increase in cooperation if  𝑐 > 𝑘! 𝛼  held prior to the increase 
in average cooperation of others. 
 We further define the expected self-serving bias Bi as the difference between the 
others expected contribution 𝑐 and the agent’s expected contribution 𝑐!:  𝐵! = 𝑐 − 𝑐! .10  We can 
                                                
10 This is in line with terminology in the existing literature on cooperation, which defines the self-serving bias as 
the difference between “perfect conditional cooperation” (exactly matching others average contribution) and 
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write this as 𝐵! = 1− 𝑝! 𝑐 + 𝑝!𝑘! 𝛼 ,  a convex combination of the average contribution of 
others and the personal parameter-determined threshold. Hence, we predict the following: 
 
PREDICTION 3. Given 𝑐 > 𝑘! 𝛼 , 0iβ >  and 0p > , higher levels of willpower iω  are 
associated with a smaller self-serving bias, and this effect increases in pi, the probability of 
identifying conflict. 
 
Though the difference between other’s average cooperation c and own cooperation is 
costly to the agent who has identified self-control conflict, costly effort is required to reduce 
this difference. Therefore, we expect a small self-serving bias with higher levels of 
willpower.11   
 
 
4. Experimental design and procedure 
  
4.1 The public goods game 
The public goods game in our experiment relies on the following payoff function for 
individual i 
 
    
𝜋! 𝑐! , 𝑐!! = 20− 𝑐! + 0.4 𝑐!!!!!     (8) 
 
where ci denotes the contribution of individual i to the public good. Each group consists 
of four randomly matched individuals, each individual receiving an endowment of 20 
experimental points (the experimental currency unit). The marginal per capita return α from 
investing in the public good is 0.4, meeting the requirements for a social dilemma. Assuming 
that participants are rational and self-interested, any α < 1 implies a dominant strategy to free-
ride. Because α ⋅n > 1, the socially optimal strategy is to contribute the entire endowment. 
                                                                                                                                                   
one’s own contribution. The latter is commonly referred to as “imperfect conditional contribution,” as 
contributions tend to imperfectly match those of others (see e.g., Fischbacher et al., 2012).   
11 Because contributions are a fixed amount below the contributions of others, the model implies that average 
conditional contributions are convex in average contributions by others, which is typically not observed. To 
account for the commonly observed pattern—a positive constant and a slope coefficient on average contributions 
by others less than one—the model would have to be adjusted. In particular, one might include a pure altruism 
component (to increase the constant when average contributions by others is low) and allow the self-control cost 
to depend on average contributions by others. 
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 The preference elicitation and the incentive mechanism in our experiment follow 
Fischbacher et al. (2001). Participants make two sets of decisions—first, an unconditional 
contribution to the public good and, thereafter, a conditional contribution schedule. The 
unconditional contribution is in the form of a single integer, 0 ≤ ci ≤ 20. For the conditional 
contribution, participants indicate how much they would contribute to the public good for any 
possible average contribution (rounded to integers) of the other three players within their 
group. For each of the 21 possible averages from 0 to 20, participants decide on a contribution 
between (and including) 0 and 20. This is a version of the strategy vector method (Selten, 
1967). 
 To achieve incentive-compatibility, both conditional and unconditional contributions 
are potentially payoff-relevant. For one group member, randomly selected by the toss of a 
four-sided die,12 the payoff depends on conditional contribution; for the other three members, 
payoffs depend on unconditional contributions. In other words, the three unconditional 
contributions within a group, and the corresponding conditional contribution (for the average 
of the three unconditional contributions), constitute the sum of contributions to the public 
good. One may then compute individual earnings, according to equation (8). 
  
4.2 Treatments 
 To test our hypothesis, we employed three between-subject treatments—the isolated, 
the standard, and the interrelated treatments—to influence perception of choice context and 
hence identification of self-control conflict. We ran two sessions per treatment, and 
participants were randomly assigned to one of the six sessions.  
The isolated and interrelated treatments were implemented with a subtle framing 
procedure designed by Myrseth and Fishbach (2010) to influence identification of self-control 
conflict, and adapted to the dictator game by Martinsson et al. (2012). Participants viewed a 
calendar showing the present month, and the calendar contained either a grid that separated 
the dates or no such grid (see Figure 1). Moreover, in the gridded calendar, the date of the 
experiment was highlighted in grey; the date was not highlighted in the non-gridded calendar. 
Because we expected those who saw the gridded calendar to adopt a more isolated view of 
their subsequent choice opportunities, we refer to this treatment as the isolated treatment. 
Conversely, because we expected participants who saw the calendar with no grid to adopt a 
                                                
12 Each group member is assigned a number from one to four. A randomly selected participant rolls the die, and 
the roll of the die is monitored by the experimenter. 
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less isolated view—the choice opportunities perceived more related to each other—we refer 
to this as the interrelated treatment. We denote as the standard treatment that which features 
no calendar and otherwise resembles the typical presentation of the public good game.13 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
The purpose of this procedure was to manipulate participants’ perception of the 
decision context, without actually changing the decision itself. As such it can be thought of as 
a framing treatment. Originally, Myrseth and Fishbach (2010) designed this framing 
technique to influence identification of self-control conflict in the face of “epsilon cost 
temptation.” Epsilon cost temptations are tempting behaviors for which unit consumption cost 
is marginal—such as the calories gained from a single cookie—but for which long-run 
aggregated costs nevertheless may prove more severe—such as an expanding waistline. The 
authors argue that the gridded relative to the non-gridded calendar activated an isolated 
(versus interrelated) frame of the choice opportunity; participants were more likely to isolate 
the date in question and thus less likely to see the decision task in relation to similar future 
opportunities. Consequently, the gridded calendar reduced the relative likelihood that 
participants would identify a conflict between the temptation to have chips and the better 
judgment to maintain a fine figure and good health. And, as argued by Myrseth & Fishbach 
(2009), individuals will go for the temptation by default, if they never identify self-control 
conflict in the first place. In other words, self-control resources—or willpower—are only 
relevant to the extent that individuals have identified self-control conflict. 
Martinsson et al. (2012) adapted this argument to the context of the dictator game, 
making the case that greed in low-stake allocation decisions also might take the form of 
epsilon cost temptation. That is, the question of whether or not to be generous—to donate to a 
charitable organization—may elicit self-control conflict if the decision is viewed in relation to 
future decisions, but not if the decision is viewed in isolation. If viewed in relation to future 
decisions, the question of how much to donate on a single occasion may have bearing on the 
decision maker’s self-image; donating now—and in the future—indicates a generous 
character, whereas keeping the money for oneself does not. However, if viewed in isolation, 
                                                
13 A priori, we could not be sure how the view of participants in the standard treatment would compare to those 
of participants in the other two treatments—this would depend on the “default” view they had coming into the 
experiment and on the framing of the standard treatment itself. However, a reasonable guess was that the 
participants in the standard treatment would fall somewhere between the narrow view in the isolated treatment 
and the wide view in the interrelated treatment, as was the case with donations in Martinsson et al. (2012). 
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the question of how much to donate has little bearing on self-image; the present decision of 
how much to donate is considered only in light of immediate consequences, leaving self-
image out of the equation. Because a consistent self-image represents an important motivator 
for pro-social behavior (see e.g., Bénabou & Tirole, 2011; Gneezy et al., 2012), they expected 
that individuals more likely would identify self-control conflict between selfish and pro-social 
behavior if the allocation decision was seen in relation to future opportunities than if it is seen 
in isolation. This mechanism is also consistent with the “logic of appropriateness” framework, 
which assumes that individuals ask themselves, “What does a person like me do in a situation 
like this?” (e.g., March, 1994; Messick, 1999; Weber et al., 2004). We assume that a person 
“like me” sees little harm in being selfish once, but holds a more altruistic objective when 
behavior is viewed more generally. Our framework can then be viewed as specifying when a 
particular logic of appropriateness is activated, thereby triggering a self-control conflict.  
Using the treatment by Myrseth and Fishbach (2010), Martinsson et al. (2012) found support 
for these ideas. Participants in the interrelated treatment—which presented a calendar without 
a grid—exhibited a positive correlation between the Rosenbaum (1980a) measure of trait self-
control and donations. However, there was no correlation among participants in the isolated 
treatment—which presented a calendar with a grid.  
For the same reasons that the framing treatment may influence self-control conflict in 
the dictator game, it may also influence self-control conflict in the public good game.  
 
4.3 Measurement of conflict identification and of trait self-control 
As argued by Myrseth and Fishbach (2009), the capacity to exercise self-control is 
relevant to the decision to indulge only when the individual has identified self-control 
conflict. Therefore, one approach to investigating whether the problem of pro-social versus 
selfish behavior resembles one of self-control is to test whether capacity for self-control is 
positively associated with pro-social behavior when the individual has felt conflicted, but less 
so or not at all when the individual has not. This is the approach taken in this paper, and by 
Martinsson et al. (2012) in a dictator game and in a recent follow-up paper by Kocher et al. 
(2012) using a public good game. Martinsson et al. (2012) made the argument by subjecting 
participants to different treatments—those discussed in the treatment section above—intended 
to manipulate the relative likelihood of conflict identification. The authors found that capacity 
for self-control was positively associated with donations in the treatment intended to raise 
likelihood of conflict identification, but not in the treatment intended to reduce the likelihood. 
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Kocher et al. (2012), however, did not subject participants to any experimental treatment. 
Rather, their results rely on a measurement of experienced conflict. They found that capacity 
for self-control was positively related to cooperation among participants who reported feeling 
conflicted during the contribution decision, but not among participants who reported no 
conflict. Our present paper seeks to test the causality of conflict identification in the public 
good, unresolved in Kocher et al. (2012), by importing the experimental treatment from the 
dictator game by Martinsson et al. (2010). We also included the conflict measure from 
Kocher et al. (2012) to verify the treatment and to replicate the pattern obtained by them. 
To capture subjectively experienced strength of conflict, we presented a question in the 
last part of the experiment similar to one used in Aaker et al. (2008) and identical to that used 
in Kocher et al. (2012): “To what extent did you experience conflict when deciding how 
much to contribute?” Participants answered this question on a continuous scale ranging from 
0 (“not at all”) to 140 (“very much”).  
To capture capacity for self-control, we implemented a standard measure of trait self-
control—the Rosenbaum Self-Control Schedule (Rosenbaum, 1980a), henceforth abbreviated 
Rosenbaum.14 This measure has been validated against a series of relevant personality 
measures, and against behavioral tasks associated with self-control, such as resisting pain 
(Rosenbaum, 1980b), coping with stress (Rosenbaum & Smira, 1986; Rosenbaum, 1989), 
coping with mental disability (Rosenbaum & Palmon, 1984), coping with seasickness 
(Rosenbaum & Rolnick, 1983), quitting smoking (Katz & Singh, 1986), saving over spending 
(Romal & Kaplan, 1995), and curtailing procrastination (Milgram et al., 1988). More 
recently, the measure has been found under certain conditions to correlate positively with pro-
social behavior—specifically, donations in a dictator game (Martinsson et al., 2012) and 
cooperation in a one-shot public good game (Kocher et al., 2012). 
 An extensive literature from personality psychology documents that the tendency to 
apply self-control represents a stable trait within the individual over time. Perhaps most 
dramatically, Mischel and colleagues report that a child’s performance at age 4 on an instant 
gratification task (e.g., one marshmallow now, or two marshmallows later) predict later in life 
their cognitive control (Eigsti et al., 2006), ability to concentrate, self-control, interpersonal 
competence, SAT scores, and drug use (Mischel et al., 1988; Mischel et al., 1989; Shoda et 
al., 1990; Ayduk et al., 2000). To top it off, Duckworth and Seligman (2005) found that a 
                                                
14 The Rosenbaum Self-Control Schedule (1980a) is included in Appendix B.  
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composite measure of trait self-control, administered among eighth-graders in the fall, 
exceeded IQ as a predictor of academic achievement in the following spring. 
 
4.4 Overview of procedure 
We recruited participants from undergraduate classes at a university in Medellín, 
Colombia, in 2008. The head administrator sent to the university email lists invitations to 
participate in economic experiments, and she posted posters on campus, as well. In addition, 
the experimenter introduced himself in classes, where he repeated the information from the 
emails. We held six sessions—two sessions for each treatment—with 24 participants per 
session. Nobody participated in more than one experimental session, and none were students 
of mathematics, psychology, or economics. Participants entered a lecture hall, after which 
they were provided an experimental id-number to ensure anonymity, and assigned a seat. The 
experiment started with the experimenter distributing instructions for the public goods game 
(see Appendix A). The experimenter read the instructions aloud to participants.15 When 
finished, all participants completed a set of control questions—to ensure comprehension. 
Participants were allowed to ask questions in private; when all had finished, the questions 
were solved in public on a black board. Thereafter, the experimenter distributed decision 
sheets for the public good game. The first page of the decision sheet was blank for all 
participants. The second page was either blank or contained a calendar, depending on 
treatment. The third page contained the answer sheet for the public good game; here the 
participant reported the amount she wished to contribute unconditionally. Once participants 
had indicated their decisions, the experimenter collected the decision sheets and distributed a 
second decision sheet; the participants were asked to provide an incentivized guess of how 
many tokens on average the other participants in the same session had contributed. Once 
participants had indicated their guess, the experimenter collected the decision sheets and 
distributed a third decision sheet; the participant indicated how much they wished to 
contribute conditionally, by completing a contribution table, as in Fischbacher et al. (2001).  
 When participants had indicated their conditional contributions, the experimenter 
collected their decision sheets and distributed a questionnaire. The questionnaire first included 
a question that asked about the degree of conflict experienced during the allocation decisions. 
                                                
15 All instructions and materials were translated into Spanish and presented to participants as such. At the time, 
we were unaware of other Spanish translations of the Rosenbaum Self-Control Schedule (Rosenbaum, 1980a), 
such as the validated translation presented in Capafóns (1989). We thus produced our own translation, but it does 
not differ substantially—see Appendix B. Our translation is identical to that used by Martinsson et al. (2012). 
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Second, it presented the Rosenbaum Self-Control Schedule (1980a), and finally it posed some 
socioeconomic questions. Upon completing the questionnaire, participants exited the room, 
lined up, and re-entered the room one-by-one to claim their payment in private. 
 
 
5. Experimental results 
 
The summary statistics in Table 1 show that both conditional and unconditional 
contributions in our sample resemble those reported elsewhere (e.g., Fischbacher et al., 2001; 
Fischbacher & Gächter, 2010). Moreover, the Rosenbaum scores are roughly similar to those 
found in other studies.16  
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
As expected, unconditional contributions are higher in the interrelated treatment (Mean 
= 8.71) than in the isolated treatment (Mean = 8.05), but this difference is not significant, p = 
0.63 (Mann-Whitney U). Finally, there is no significant difference in Rosenbaum between the 
interrelated (Mean = 29.41) and isolated (Mean = 31.51) treatments, p = 0.64 (Mann-Whitney 
U). 
 
5.1 Conditional contributions 
Our experiment elicited both conditional and unconditional contributions to the public 
good. We start by analyzing conditional contributions.  
 With the vector strategy method, each participant indicated 21 contribution levels for 
all possible average contribution levels (rounded to integers) of the other group members. The 
elicitation schedule was fully incentivized.  Testing Predictions 1 through 3, Table 2 presents 
an OLS analysis of the conditional contributions as a function of Rosenbaum scores and 
average contributions by others (denoted Others). For simplicity of exposition, we break 
down our analysis by treatments. 
 
                                                
16 The grand mean is slightly above the corresponding range of means from the original samples studied by 
Rosenbaum (1980a, b)—Mean = 29.7 vs. Means ranging from 23 to 27. It is above that (Mean = 16.7) obtained 
in Germany by Kocher et al. (2012), but close to that (Mean = 32.1) obtained in Colombia by Martinsson et al. 
(2012).    
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 Insert Table 2 about here 
 
All specifications replicate a commonly found pattern—that the level of others’ average 
contributions is strongly associated with own contributions (e.g., Gächter, 2007; Kocher et al., 
2008; Fischbacher & Gächter, 2010; Kocher et al., 2012).17  
Consistent with Prediction 1, specifications (7) and (8) reveal a positive and significant 
coefficient (p’s < 0.05) on the Rosenbaum main effect; in the interrelated treatment, trait self-
control is positively associated with cooperation. However, the corresponding main effects for 
the isolated and standard treatments—in specifications (1-2) and (4-5), respectively—are not 
significant (p’s > 0.77). This latter result is also consistent with Prediction 1, which states that 
the positive association between self-control and cooperation increases in the probability of 
identifying self-control conflict.  
In line with Prediction 2, specifications (2), (3), (5), (6), and (8) yield a positive and 
significant coefficient on the Others main effect. That is, contributions increase in the amount 
contributed by other players. 
Specification (9) provides support for Prediction 3. The coefficient on the interaction 
between Rosenbaum and Others is positive and significant (p < 0.01). This means that the 
self-serving bias—the discrepancy between what others contribute and what the player 
contributes—diminishes with self-control in the interrelated treatment. Furthermore, the 
corresponding coefficients for the isolated and standard treatments—in specifications (3) and 
(6), respectively—are not significant, (p’s > 0.37). This is also consistent with Prediction 3, 
which states that the self-serving bias should diminish with self-control more sharply with a 
higher likelihood of identifying self-control conflict. 
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
In the aforementioned analyses, we have broken the data down by treatments. To 
directly test the differences in the interaction effects found in Table 2 on specifications (3), (6) 
and (9), we provide the full specification in Table 3 (specification 10), which includes the 
treatments as variables.  This also provides a direct test of Prediction 3, which states that the 
association between cooperation and the Rosenbaum-Others interaction is stronger in the 
                                                
17 In Kocher et al. (2012), the main effect of others’ average contributions disappears in a regression analysis 
that includes risk preferences, but is otherwise similar. 
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interrelated than in the isolated treatment. Consistent with Prediction 3, the coefficient on the 
interaction between Rosenbaum, Others, and Isolated, in specification (10), is negative and 
significant (p < 0.05), while the interaction between Rosenbaum and Others positive and 
significant (p < 0.01) (recall that the Interrelated treatment represents the baseline in 
specification 10). This result verifies that the self-serving bias diminishes with self-control 
more sharply in the interrelated than in the isolated treatment.  
We summarize our results below, according to Predictions 1-3, respectively: 
 
RESULT 1a: In the interrelated treatment, there is a positive association between levels of 
trait self-control and conditional cooperation, but there is no discernable association in the 
isolated treatment. 
 
RESULT 2: There is a positive association between conditional cooperation and the average 
cooperation by others. 
 
RESULT 3: In the interrelated treatment, there is a negative association between the degree 
of self-serving bias and levels of self-control, but there is no discernable association in the 
isolated treatment.   
 
Our results are of economic significance; the marginal effect in the interrelated 
treatment of Others is: 0.215+0.006Rosenbaum score;18 The marginal effect evaluated at the 
mean of the Rosenbaum score (Mean = 29.99) approximates to 0.395. That is, if contribution 
by others to the public good increases by one unit, then a participant increases contribution to 
the public good by 0.395 units. The marginal effect evaluated at one standard deviation (std. 
dev. = 19.94) above the mean Rosenbaum score approximates to a marginal effect of 0.515, 
which corresponds to a 30% increase.  
We turn next to a robustness analysis, which also serves to illustrate our results; we plot 
average contributions for increasing levels of each independent variable. The average 
contributions are presented in Figures 2-4 for the isolated, standard and interrelated 
treatments, respectively. Figures 2 and 3 show that conditional contributions rise with Others. 
This corresponds to the standard observation in public goods experiments, and to Prediction 
                                                
18 The marginal effect of Others is below 1 for all possible values of the Rosenbaum. This means that our 
estimated model implies imperfect conditional cooperators. A higher Rosenbaum brings participants closer to 
perfect conditional cooperators. 
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2. Notably, those figures show no discernable association between conditional contributions 
and the Rosenbaum. Figure 4, reveals a similar sensitivity to Others. However, consistent 
with Prediction 3, the positive association between Others and contributions appears stronger 
for the two highest levels of Rosenbaum. Moreover, there is no association between 
Rosenbaum and contributions for the lowest level of Others, but a fairly strong positive 
association for the highest level of Others. The highest level of cooperation in the Interrelated 
treatment occurs when both the Rosenbaum and Others take high values. 
 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
 
We next to turn our conflict variable, denoted Conflict, which offers the opportunity for 
a treatment check. Participants reported mean Conflict levels of 47.11 (std. dev. = 32.98), 
68.08 (std. dev. = 39.57), and 61.70 (std. dev. = 42.55), in the isolated, standard, and 
interrelated treatments, respectively. A Kruskal-Wallis test reveals no equality in 
distributions, p < 0.05. Of particular interest to us is the difference between the isolated and 
interrelated treatments, p < 0.1 (Mann-Whitney U).19 This provides additional (though weak) 
evidence that our treatments successfully manipulated conflict identification.  
Furthermore, because our experimental treatments were intended to manipulate conflict 
identification, we could run an alternative regression that substitutes the Conflict variable for 
our treatment variables. Accordingly, specification (11) resembles specification (10) (see 
Table 3), with the exception that the former features Conflict rather than the treatment 
variables. While the three-way interaction between Rosenbaum, Others, and Conflict is in the 
predicted direction (positive), it is not significant. We explore the data further, in Table 4, 
where we examine the two-way interaction between Rosenbaum and Conflict across different 
intervals of Others. For the two lowest intervals, the interaction is not significant—but for the 
three highest, it is positive and significant (p’s < 0.1, 0.1, and 0.05, respectively). Overall, the 
pattern is conceptually consistent with that obtained by Kocher et al. (2012). 
                                                
19 A t-test yields significance at the 0.05-level for the difference between the isolated and the interrelated 
treatment. The difference between the isolated and standard treatment is significant (p < 0.05), but that between 




Insert Table 4 about here 
 
Our final analysis of conditional cooperation concerns the distribution of contributor 
types, classified according to the standard approach (see e.g., Fischbacher et al., 2001; 
Fischbacher & Gächter, 2010). Conditional cooperators submitted a contribution schedule 
with a (weakly, with at least one strict step) monotonically increasing contribution for an 
increasing average contribution by the other group members.20 Free-riders indicated zero 
conditional contributions for every possible average contribution by the other members. 
Hump-shape contributors (also known as Triangle contributors) reported (weakly, with at 
least one strict step) monotonically increasing contributions up to a certain average level of 
others’ contributions, above which their contributions schedule is (weakly, with at least one 
strict step) monotonically decreasing. The category referred to as Residual comprises the 
remaining participants.21 Our data, across conditions, yields a distribution of types—shown in 
Table 5—within the range of those found in past studies (e.g., Fischbacher et al., 2001; 
Kocher et al., 2008; Herrman & Thöni, 2009; Thöni et al., 2009; Fischbacher & Gächter, 
2010). 
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
As in Kocher et al. (2012), our model makes a prediction about the likelihood that Free-
riders relative to other types have identified self-control conflict. Specifically, given that 
Free-riders—who by definition have contributed less—exhibit similar levels of trait self-
control, they should be less likely to have identified the conflict between keeping the money 
and contributing, and so less likely to have drawn on their self-control strategies to promote 
pro-social behavior. Indeed, consistent with this prediction, free-riders reported a significantly 
lower average level of conflict than did other types (p < 0.01; Mann-Whitney-U). We thus 
conclude, like Kocher et al. (2012), that free-riders seem to have contributed less because they 
were less likely to see a self-control conflict and, therefore, less likely to draw on their self-
control strategies to promote pro-social behavior. 
                                                
20 We also included those without a weakly monotonically increasing contribution, but with a highly significant 
(p < 0.01) positive Spearman rank correlation coefficient between own and others’ contributions (see 
Fischbacher et al., 2001; Fischbacher & Gächter, 2010). 
21 This category is usually referred to in the literature as Others, but we choose a different label to avoid 




5.2. Unconditional contributions    
We next turn to our OLS analysis of unconditional contributions, given in Table 6.  
 
Insert Table 6 about here 
 
Consistent with Prediction 1, specification (19) reveals that the Rosenbaum exhibits a 
positive and significant correlation (p < 0.1) with unconditional contributions for individuals 
in the interrelated treatment, who were relatively more likely to identify self-control conflict 
than were those in the isolated treatment.22 However, among those in the isolated treatment—
specification (17)—there is no significant correlation between Rosenbaum and unconditional 
contributions. The result is summarized below, in Result 1b, corresponding to Prediction 1: 
 
RESULT 1b: In the interrelated treatment, there is a positive association between levels of 
trait self-control and unconditional cooperation, but there is no discernable association in the 
isolated treatment. 
 
Furthermore, we conducted an auxiliary test, reported in Table 7, to verify consistency 
with the corresponding pattern of correlations obtained in Kocher et al. (2012). The 
interaction in specification (21) between Rosenbaum and conflict intensity shows that the 
positive correlation between unconditional contributions and trait self-control is stronger (p < 
0.05) among participants who reported stronger feelings of conflict—and who were 
presumably more likely to have identified self-control conflict. 
 





We have tested the hypothesis that identification of self-control conflict gives rise to a 
stronger positive correlation between self-control and cooperation. In a standard public good 
                                                
22 In Table 7, specification (20), which includes dummy variables for treatments and the appropriate interaction 
terms, indicates significance at the 0.05-level. Although specification (20) is more powerful, we chose to present 
the results in Table in 6—broken down by treatments—for expositional purposes. 
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experiment, we find that trait self-control is positively associated with cooperation in the 
framing treatment that facilitate identification of self-control conflict, but we find no 
discernable association in the treatment that does not. Our results hold both for conditional 
and unconditional cooperation; the self-serving bias—the discrepancy between conditional 
contributions and the contributions by other players—is lower for higher levels of trait self-
control. Furthermore, we find that free-riders are characterized not by lacking trait self-
control, but by appearing not to have perceived the self-control conflict in the first place. 
Overall, our results suggest that self-control benefits cooperation. 
Our results are consistent with recent work by Martinsson et al. (2012), who employ an 
identical framing treatment in the dictator game; they find that trait-self control, captured on 
the same psychometric scale (Rosenbaum, 1980a), is positively associated with donations in 
the treatment that facilitates identification—but that there is no association in the treatment 
that does not. Moreover, our results extend those obtained by Kocher et al. (2012), who test in 
the public good game a more general model of self-control and pro-social behavior. Their 
empirical procedure includes the Rosenbaum measure of self-control and a risk elicitation 
procedure. However, they did not employ experimental treatments to influence perception of 
self-control conflict—instead they relied on individuals’ self-reports of experienced conflict. 
Their findings, therefore, leave open questions of causality, and it was our objective here to 
explore that of conflict identification. Not only do we find evidence for the causal story 
theorized by Kocher et al. (2012), we also replicate across our treatments their pattern of 
correlations. 
Moreover, our results are consistent with a number of other findings in the literature, 
perhaps most notably that contributions to the public good are negatively associated with 
discount rates (Curry et al., 2008; Fehr & Leibbrandt, 2011). However, our results speak 
against the general hypothesis, put forward by Rand et al. (2012), that cooperation is 
‘intuitive’ and greed ‘calculated’. In fact, the literature on the relation between cognitive 
resources and cooperation offers mixed results (e.g., Duffy & Smith, 2012; Tinghög et al., 
2013; Lohse et al., 2014; Rand et al., 2014)—as does the literature on cognitive resources and 
giving (e.g., Hauge et al., 2009; Schulz et al., 2014; Achtziger et al., 2014a).  
On the question of generality, therefore, we echo a note of humility from Martinsson et 
al. (2012). While our present results do suggest that individuals are tempted to be selfish and 
that higher levels of self-control will benefit cooperation, there is good reason to think that the 
pattern under other circumstances might reverse. In particular, when the beneficiaries of the 
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public good are concrete, triggering feelings of empathy, the urge to cooperate might conflict 
with a better judgment to cooperate less. For example, the diligent student who feels sorry for 
her poorly performing group members might feel compelled to do everything in a group 
project that awards the same grade to every group member. In our experiment, however, the 
beneficiaries are anonymous and hence highly abstract—as is standard in the public good 
game—and therefore unlikely to evoke empathetic urges.  
Following a similar logic, our conceptual framework may aid in understanding why 
recent studies have found that individuals actively eschew opportunities to donate to others 
(e.g., Dana et al., 2006; Broberg et al., 2007; Andreoni et al., 2011; Knutsson et al., 2013). 
Knowing that a donation opportunity will present itself, it is possible that individuals may 
anticipate feeling pressured to give and thus identify a potential self-control conflict. The 
pressure might arise from empathy, as when facing a solicitor (e.g., in Androni et al., 2011), 
or, when confronted with a charity donation request, from social norm activation (Knutsson et 
al., 2013). In either case, the individual might resolve to preempt the self-control conflict by 
engaging a pre-commitment technology, thereby avoiding the difficult donation decision 
altogether. 
A critic might respond that our framework is too flexible, in that it allows the 
directionality of the temptation to go either way, and by implication, pre-commitment 
decisions to do the same. How then could we resolve the question as to which behavior 
constitutes the human “universal” default? Given the disparate findings in the literature, and 
our basic understanding of cognitive processes, we would maintain that the flexibility of our 
framework is necessary. The problem, then, might not be our framework—but the question; it 
may not be meaningful to speak of a universal default to be selfish or cooperative. Similarly, 
it may not be meaningful to argue, as some recently have, that one or the other is more 
intuitive. Our results and theoretical framework, together with an extensive literature in 
psychology and economics, suggest that the question of which is more intuitive—whether one 
or the other constitutes a “default”—will depend very much on the context at hand.  
We end by noting that the relationship between cooperation and self-control has 
implications for the study of strategic interaction more generally. If self-control determines 
cooperation, self-control may also determine players’ strategic concerns in other interactions, 
where the choice of one player affects the welfare of others. An exploration into the role of 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 




Dev. Min Max 
Unconditional contribution Unconditional contribution to the 
public good 
156 8.17 6.27 0 20 
Conditional contribution* Conditional contribution to the public 
good 
3297 5.41 6.06 0 20 
Others A vector of integer numbers between 
and including 0 and 20, indicating all 
possible average contributions of the 
three other group members in the 
conditional contribution task 
3297 10 6.06 0 20 
Conflict Response to "To what extent did you 
experience conflict when deciding how 
much to contribute?" ranging from 0 
("Not at all") and 140 ("Very much") 
157 58.45 39.20 0 140 
Rosenbaum The Rosenbaum Self-Control Schedule 
Score 
154 29.71 19.90 -16 77 
Isolated Isolated treatment presenting a 
calendar with a grid separating the 
dates prior to the contribution decision 
157 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Standard Standard treatment presenting no 
calendar prior to the contribution 
decision 
157 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Interrelated  Interrelated treatment presenting a 
calendar without a grid separating the 
dates prior to the contribution decision 
157 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Note: * Denotes a variable constructed using the strategy method. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
